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Abstract 
This paper introduces the Cummins Functions Approach to neural representations 
(CFA), which aims to capture the notion of representation that is relevant to 
contemporary neuroscientific practice. CFA shares the common view that 'to be a 
representation of X' amounts to 'having the function of tracking X', but maintains that 
the relevant notion of function is defined by Robert Cummins's account. Thus, CFA 
offers a notion of neural representation that is dependent on explanatory context. I 
argue that CFA can account for the normativity of neural representations, and defend 
its dependence on explanations. 
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At first pass, a physical representation is a vehicle of content or information. 
Within contemporary neuroscientific explanations, it is common practice to refer to 
internal neural states or structures as "representations", as carriers of information, or 
as coding a signal. And yet the nature of such "neural representations" is far from 
clear. How should we define the notion of representation that is relevant to 
contemporary neuroscience? Furthermore, what makes something a neural 
representation of some specific content X? A theory of content for neural 
representations should be able to answer these questions. Thus far, no existing theory 
has been widely accepted as achieving this task. 
This paper introduces the Cummins Functions Approach to neural 
representations (CFA). CFA combines two well-known ideas, the first of which we 
will call "the shared conception", and the second is Cummins's (1975) notion of 
function. Both will be described in section 2. In short, "the shared conception" is the 
broadly defined view that 'to be a representation of X' is ultimately 'to have the 
function of tracking X'. Through one interpretation or another, this basic idea is 
agreed upon by many of the existing theories of content for neural representations. 
Where CFA diverges from existing views is by appealing to Cummins functions (as 
opposed to historical functions) in unpacking this shared conception. This will define 
the Cummins functions approach to neural representations, as described in section 3. 
Section 3 will also include a brief example of the way CFA can account for 
representations in neuroscience. 
The rest of the paper will then be devoted to defending this approach, in the 
face of what I take to be its most significant possible objections. In section 4, I argue 
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that Cummins functions can enable an account of the normativity of neural 
representations. Section 5 expands on CFA's appeal to explanatory context, clarifying 
the extent and the significance of this appeal. I then continue to defend CFA's 
dependence on explanatory context in section 6. I argue that it does not contradict the 
current neuroscientific practice, and that CFA's violation of the naturalistic constraint 
should not dissuade us from accepting it. 
 
2. Preliminaries 
2.1. The Shared Conception 
While, as stated above, there is no consensus theory of content philosophers 
have subscribed to, we can point to a broad approach that is widely shared. Following 
Morgan and Piccinini (2017) we can define "the shared conception" of existing 
theories of content: "While this summary elides over a great many differences, 
proponents of naturalizing intentionality arrived at a shared conception of what a 
naturalistic theory of content should look like, and indeed of the very nature of 
intentionality. They conceptualized intentionality as a special kind of causal-
informational relation between an internal state – a representation – and a distal entity, 
where the internal state has the function of responding to, or tracking, the distal entity. 
If the internal state fails to track that entity, it can be evaluated as incorrect or 
inaccurate." (p. 10) 
In short, we define "the shared conception" as: 
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(*) A representation of X has the function of tracking X.1  
Of course, for the shared conception (*) to become an actual theory of content 
for neural representations, one would have to properly explicate how the notion of 
function and the notion of tracking are best understood, and this is where different 
theories diverge. While the broadly defined "shared conception" is not committed to 
any specific definition of these notions, it still carries some basic understanding of 
both. As for tracking- it is generally assumed to be some causal-informational relation 
that (on its own) does not allow for mistakes. Following Neander (2017a, p.83) we 
can consider this as a commitment to some "natural-factive information relation", 
such as Grice's (1957) "natural meaning". And as for the notion of function- on the 
shared conception it must enable precisely this talk of normativity and 
misrepresentation. We can again follow Neander (2017a) and consider the shared 
conception as committed to a notion of "normal-proper function", where: "'normal-
proper function' is here identified by ostension. The relevant notion of a normal-
proper function is the one that most centrally underwrites talk of normal function, of 
systems functioning properly, of malfunction, dysfunction, abnormal functioning, 
impaired functioning, and functional deficits." (Neander 2017a, p. 52)2 
 
1 It is worth noting that this broad idea about the nature of representation goes beyond 
talk of neural representations or "natural representations". In fact, it is often our 
understanding of non-natural representations that best motivates this approach (see, for 
example, (Dretske 1988, pp. 59-62)). 
2 Identifying the notions of tracking and function along the lines of (Neander 2017a) 
also means that the shared conception (*) is entirely consistent with Neander's broad 
definition of informational teleosemantics (see Neander 2017a, p. 86). 
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But these broad, or ostensive, descriptions of tracking and function still have 
to be unpacked by actual theories of content. And if we take a look at how existing 
theories interpret the relevant notion of function, there seems to be a common thread 
among them- they all define neural representations by appealing to some historical 
notion of function. On the most popular approach the function of a representation, or a 
representational vehicle, is defined by what it was selected for through some 
evolutionary process of selection (e.g. Millikan 1984, 1989, 2004, Neander 1995, 
2017a). Others have also appealed to a natural process of learning (e.g. Dretske 1988, 
1995) or to selection in virtue of "contribution to an organism's persistence" (Shea 
2018). While these theories might differ in pointing out the relevant type of historical 
process, they still all define representations through a historical notion of function. 
The aim of this paper is to promote an appeal to a different notion of function- that of 




3 This paper stays away from any debates over the relevant notion of tracking. But to 
state a few possible interpretations we can mention, for example, Dretske's (1988) 
"indication" relation, as well as his (1981) formal definition of information in terms of 
conditional probabilities. Stampe (1977) gives a causal analysis of the natural 
information relation, as does Neander (2017a). Shea (2018) talks of 2 kinds of 
"exploitable relations"- correlational information, defined in terms of conditional 
probabilities, and structural similarity, which can both be considered as a type of 
tracking for our current concerns (despite the fact that Shea's view isn't exactly on par 
with the shared conception as described above). The shared conception (*) generalizes 
over these and other definitions of tracking. 
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2.2. Cummins Functions 
Debates over 'what is the relevant notion of function' are hardly limited to the 
issue of representations. There is a wider philosophical debate, about understanding 
the relevant notion of function for scientific explanations in general, and physiological 
explanations in particular. And within that debate Cummins functions play a 
significant role. In what follows, Cummins defines when is it the case that a certain 
internal component 𝑥 (e.g. the heart), within a containing system 𝑠 (e.g. the 
circulatory system), has the function 𝜙 (e.g. to pump blood). Note that the definition 
is relative an analytical account 𝐴 (i.e. an explanation) of some capacity 𝜓 that is 
performed by the containing system. 
Cummins Functions: 
"𝑥 functions as a 𝜙 in 𝑠 (or: the function of 𝑥 in 𝑠 is to 𝜙) relative to an 
analytical account 𝐴 of 𝑠's capacity to 𝜓 just in case 𝑥 is capable of 𝜙-ing in 𝑠 
and 𝐴 appropriately and adequately accounts for 𝑠's capacity to 𝜓 by, in part, 
appealing to the capacity of 𝑥 to 𝜙 in 𝑠." (Cummins 1975, p. 762) 
 On this view 𝑥 has the function 𝜙, not because it evolved to have that 
function, or it was selected for that function in some other manner. Rather 𝑥 has the 
function 𝜙 because the fact that 𝑥 is capable of 𝜙 allows us to explain how the 
containing system achieves a more general capacity (𝜓). Importantly, this means that 
functions are defined relative to an explanation: “To ascribe a function to something 
is to ascribe a capacity to it which is singled out by its role in an analysis of some 
capacity of a containing system.” (Cummins 1975, p. 765) 
We should note that Cummins functions are sometimes referred to as role 
functions, causal-role functions, system functions, or systematic functions. The latter 
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is also how Cummins himself refers to such functions. There are also some variations 
on how we should define such functions, but we will focus mainly on Cummins's 
classic (1975) account. Accordingly, we will continue to refer to these as Cummins 
functions. And with regards to the general debate over how to understand functional 
attributions in the physiological sciences, Cummins functions are often regarded as a 
viable candidate.4 
Importantly, though, this paper does not take a stance with regards to the 
interpretation of functional attributions in any general sense. I only wish to claim that 
Cummins functions can figure into an account of neural representations. Clearly, that 
would carry some commitment to Cummins's account of function, but that does not 
necessarily mean that all functional attributions in neuroscience should be understood 
in this manner, and it definitely does not mean that functional attributions in the 
biological or physiological sciences should always be understood as Cummins 
functions. In this paper, we restrict our commitment to Cummins functions only to 
those functions that are relevant to defining representations. And I believe that, in this 
context of neural representations, Cummins functions have been grossly overlooked. 
Let us now see how an appeal to Cummins functions can feature in a theory of content 
for neural representations. 
 
 
4 Neander (2017b) discusses the notion of function used in "explaining how bodies and 
brains operate" and states that "Cummins’ (1975) notion, as originally defined […] is 
often taken to be the clearly relevant notion for such an explanatory context." (p. 1147) 
She illustrates this with a wide variety of quotes from the relevant literature, before 
going on to argue against this apparent consensus. 
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3. The Cummins Functions Approach 
3.1. Definition 
 The Cummins Functions Approach (CFA) simply combines the shared 
conception (*) with Cummins's (1975) account of function. This will define a notion 
of internal representation that is dependent on explanatory context, just as Cummins 
functions are. But since we are currently only interested in the neural representations 
that are relevant to neuroscientific explanations, we will restrict our definition 
accordingly. While Cummins's (1975) account can define the function of any internal 
component, relative to some explanation of its containing system, CFA's definition of 
neural representations will focus only on neural internal components, relative to 
some neuroscientific explanation of its containing system. Other than that, CFA 
directly follows Cummins's definition of function quoted above. There, Cummins 
explained when some capacity 𝜙 of an internal component 𝑥 can be regarded as its 
function. Now, if we look only at those cases where 𝜙 is a capacity of tracking, and 
assume (*) that representations are defined by a function of tracking, then Cummins's 
definition of function also entails a notion of representation: 
The Cummins Functions Approach (CFA) to neural representations: 
Suppose that 𝑥 is an internal neural component of 𝑠, that 𝑠 has some capacity to 𝜓, 
and that 𝐴 is a neuroscientific explanation of 𝑠's capacity to 𝜓. Then, 
𝑥 is a neural representation of X, relative to 𝐴, just in case: 
1. 𝑥 is capable of tracking X, and 
2. 𝐴 appropriately and adequately accounts for 𝑠's capacity to 𝜓 by, in part, 
appealing to the capacity of 𝑥 to track X. 
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There are a couple of points worth stressing here, before moving on. First, 
CFA does not amount to a well-defined notion of neural representation, since we have 
not offered a definition of tracking. This is why we consider this as an approach to 
neural representations, and not as an actual theory of content. This approach 
generalizes over various possible definitions of tracking, and as such it defines a 
family of possible theories of content. 
Second, on this approach neural representations are only defined relative to a 
given explanation. And following Cummins, we demand that the explanation A 
"appropriately and adequately accounts for 𝑠's capacity to 𝜓." Yet, we will refrain 
from defining what makes an explanation "appropriate and adequate". CFA is not 
committed to, and not dependent on, any account of explanation in general, or 
neuroscientific explanations in particular. Given a neuroscientific explanation, CFA 
will enable our understanding of the neural representations that are considered within 
it, under the assumption that this explanation "appropriately and adequately explains 
𝑠's capacity to 𝜓". Furthermore, CFA is also not committed to Cummins's view of 
scientific explanations as functional analyses- whereby a complex capacity is 
explained by appealing to the systematic organization of simpler capacities. We will 
assume that the Cummins function of a particular component is defined by its 
contribution to the capacity of a containing system, relative to some explanation 𝐴, 
but we need not assume that the explanation 𝐴 is itself a functional analysis.5 
 
5 It should also be clear that while this paper argues for a "Cummins functions 
approach" to neural representations, it does not convey Cummins's own approach to 
neural representations, which is far more focused on isomorphisms and structural 




 Let us now illustrate how CFA can account for the notion of representation 
found in neuroscientific explanations. We will consider the vestibulo-ocular reflex 
(VOR) which is the phenomenon of maintaining a steady eye gaze while the head 
moves. An explanation of this phenomenon, adapted from (Robinson 1989),6 is very 







Figure 1. The explanation of VOR. 
"On the right the canals transduce head velocity, ?̇?, and report it, coded as the 
modulation of the discharge rate, 𝑅𝑉1, of primary vestibular afferents to the 
vestibular nucleus, 𝑣𝑛. This signal becomes an eye velocity command for 
vestibular movements, ?̇?𝑣, which is sent directly to the motoneurons, 𝑚𝑛, and 
to the neural integrator, 𝑁𝐼, to provide the needed position signal 𝐸. These 
signals provide those needed by the motoneurons modulating by Δ𝑅𝑚." 
(Robinson 1989, p.35) 
 
6 This explanation of VOR is also discussed in (Bechtel & Shagrir 2015, Shagrir 2018). 
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 For the purposes of this paper, we need not delve into the details of this 
explanation of VOR. Suffice to say that it describes the mechanism underlying VOR 
as an information-processing mechanism, whereby internal neural components are 
regarded as carrying content or information. But still, if we wish to claim that these 
internal components truly are neural representations, then we need an account of 
what being a neural representation amounts to. For example, this explanation clearly 
regards the primary vestibular afferents as carriers of a head velocity signal, coded by 
their discharge rate (𝑅𝑉1). But in order to claim that these neurons are a neural 
representation of head velocity, we need to show that they meet some clearly defined 
criteria for being a representation of head velocity, and that is what theories of 
content aim to achieve. 
CFA can account for the representational status of the primary vestibular 
afferents, though we will need to say something more about tracking. As defined 
above, CFA is uncommitted to any definition of tracking, but some assumption will 
be necessary in order to illustrate this approach on any specific example. In this case, 
we will assume that the fact that the discharge rate of the primary vestibular afferents 
correlates with head velocity (as described in figure 1) can be taken as meaning that 
the primary vestibular afferents track head velocity. This is a nontrivial assumption 
but also an uncontroversial one. It is consistent with existing possible definitions of 
tracking and I believe most philosophers would accept it. For us, the interesting 
question is not whether the vestibular afferents track head velocity, but whether it is 
their function to do so. 
As stated, existing theories of content have dealt with such questions through 
some historical notion of function, such as claiming that the primary vestibular 
afferents have the function of tracking head velocity because they were naturally 
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selected for this capacity in the evolutionary process. But now, let us fit this example 
to the definition of CFA given above. We have an internal neural component 𝑥- the 
primary vestibular afferents, of some system 𝑠- the brain7, where 𝑠 has a certain 
capacity 𝜓- to maintain steady eye gaze while the head moves. We also have a 
neuroscientific explanation 𝐴 of how the brain maintains its gaze, i.e. an analytical 
account of 𝑠's capacity to 𝜓. 𝐴 is the explanation of VOR found in (Robinson 1989), 
and described in figure 1. Thus, according to CFA, we can state that: 
The primary vestibular afferents (𝑥) are a neural representation of head velocity (X), 
relative to 𝐴, just in case: 
1. The primary vestibular afferents are capable of tracking head velocity, and 
2. 𝐴 appropriately and adequately accounts for the brain's capacity to maintain 
steady eye gaze while the head moves (VOR) by, in part, appealing to the 
capacity of the primary vestibular afferents to track head velocity. 
We have already assumed that condition 1 holds- that the primary vestibular 
afferents are capable of tracking head velocity. We also assumed that this tracking 
relation is identified by the neurons' discharge rate correlating with head velocity. 
Therefore, I believe it is quite clear that condition 2 holds as well. The fact that the 
vestibular afferents track head velocity seems to be the only capacity of theirs that the 
explanation of VOR appeals to. Of course, their basic ability to transfer a signal via 
neural excitation or inhibition must also be relevant to the explanation, but that would 
clearly be true for all components of the mechanism. And it is not this ability that 
 
7 We can also consider 𝑠 as the specific subsystem of the brain which is comprised of 
the vestibulo-ocular mechanism. But regarding the brain as 𝑠 is simpler and good 
enough for our needs. 
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accounts for the role of this specific component – the primary vestibular afferents – in 
enabling VOR. Tracking head velocity is what accounts for that. Tracking head 
velocity is the capacity of the primary vestibular afferents which, in part, allows us to 
explain the functioning of the containing mechanism and understand the phenomenon 
of VOR. Thus condition 2 would hold, and we can conclude that, according to CFA, 
the primary vestibular afferents are a neural representation of head velocity, relative 
to the explanation of VOR. 
I contend that CFA offers the right path towards understanding the notion of 
representation that is at use throughout current neuroscientific practice. Let us now 
scrutinize this claim through some possible challenges. 
 
4. Normativity 
 Some objections to CFA can be derived from existing objections to 
Cummins's (1975) account of function. The first is that Cummins functions do not 
allow for malfunction. If a component's function is defined by something it does that 
contributes to a containing system, then if for some reason the component does not do 
this particular something, then it does not have a function. Thus, no room is left for 
the possibility of malfunction. If that is indeed the case, then CFA would not be able 
to account for the normativity of representations. Furthermore, we defined CFA as 
committed to the shared conception (*), which is in turn committed to some notion of 
"normal-proper function"- defined by ostension as a notion of function that can 
underwrite talk of "normal functioning" and "malfunction". We must therefore show 
that Cummins functions can play this role. 
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 Neander (2017b) shows that Cummins's original (1975) paper does not 
amount to an account of normal-proper functions. But while it is true that (Cummins 
1975) did not clarify how it allows for malfunction, this has since been clarified 
elsewhere. As Godfrey-Smith (1993, p.200) states: "Although it is not always 
appreciated, the distinction between function and malfunction can be made within 
Cummins' framework […]. If a token of a component of a system is not able to do 
whatever it is that other tokens do, that plays a distinguished role in the explanation of 
the capacities of the broader system, then that token component is malfunctional. The 
concept of malfunction is context-dependent on Cummins' view, just as the concept of 
function in general is." 
 Cummins himself has also explained the normativity of his account in a 
similar manner (see Cummins 1996, p. 116, Cummins & Roth 2010, p. 79). The idea 
is that function is assigned to a type, and based on a capacity of that type that 
contributes to the functioning of the containing system. Tokens have their function in 
virtue of their type. Once a specific token does not perform this capacity, and hence 
does not contribute accordingly to the containing system, that is a malfunction of that 
token. Neander (2017b, p. 1164) mentions this view, and acknowledges that it does 
"make space for token malfunction", she just doesn't consider this as Cummins's 
(1975) approach. Neander considers this as Godfrey-Smith's (1993) view of modified 
Cummins functions. But obviously, how we call the relevant notion of function, and 
who we attribute it to, isn't the main issue here. What matters is that we consider 
Cummins functions as allowing for malfunction and normative distinctions as 
illustrated above. 
Accordingly, CFA will be able to account for misrepresentations. As 
representations are defined by a function of tracking, misrepresentations are defined 
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by a malfunction of tracking. Consider the example of VOR above. We assumed that 
there exists a tracking relation between the primary vestibular afferents and head 
velocity, and that it is the function of these neurons to track head velocity in this 
manner. The tracking relation, however it is ultimately defined, must hold between 
types, and there can be cases of tokens which, for some reason, do not track head 
velocity. If a person's vestibular afferents do not track head velocity, then they do not 
properly perform the tracking function of the vestibular afferents. They cannot 
contribute what they are meant to contribute to the analyzed capacity (VOR). That is a 
token malfunction of tracking, hence a misrepresentation. 
The normativity of representations is thus dependent on the normativity of 
Cummins functions, which is enabled by the type-token distinction described above. 
But critics have claimed that Cummins functions will run into trouble once we try to 
describe how the function of a type is determined. Since some tokens of this type will 
exhibit the relevant effect, while others might not, how do we define this effect as the 
function of the type? Neander (2017b, pp. 1165-1166) raises this concern within a 
series of questions that she poses for the proponent of what she refers to as "modified" 
Cummins functions. When Garson (2019) makes this point to criticize Cummins 
functions he initially assumes that the type-token malfunction distinction must depend 
on statistical considerations (e.g. the percentage of tokens that exhibit the relevant 
effect) to assign a function to a type. "This is, at root, to rely on a statistical norm for 
making sense of dysfunction." (p. 1152) But that is overlooking one of the most 
significant features of Cummins functions- that they are defined relative to an 
explanation of a more complex capacity. An effect is defined to be the function of a 
type if a scientific explanation identifies this effect as contributing to the capacity of a 
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containing system (the capacity which is being explained). And that is not necessarily 
dependent on the percentage of tokens that exhibit this effect. 
Garson goes on to object to this proposal – by which the explanation plays a 
role in defining the function of a type – as well. He claims it amounts to a notion of 
function that is far too subjective. We will discuss this objection, and how it might 
affect CFA, in the next section. For now, what should be clear is that if we can define 
the function of a type by its role as described in a scientific explanation, then we can 
account for malfunction, relative to that explanation. And in this sense, we will be 
able to consider Cummins functions as normal-proper functions. Neander (2017b) 
seems to accept this, when she acknowledges that an "instrumentalist" approach 
would be capable of dealing with her questions of how function is defined for a type: 
"The instrumentalist can deny that there are general answers to be given, and can 
instead maintain that the answers are determined by the pragmatics of the explanatory 
context on a case-by-case basis." (p. 1166) Neander raises other concerns for such 
dependence on explanatory context, which we will soon discuss. But for our current 
interests, Neander does not seem to object to the claim that the proposed view – which 
defines the function of a type relative to an explanation and allows for token 
malfunction as described above – can be consistent with the ostensive definition of 
normal proper function. 
Thus, we have shown the manner in which Cummins functions are normative 
and how that normativity can allow CFA to account for the normativity of 
representations. But as stated, there are further objections to this account's reliance on 




5. Understanding the Appeal to Explanatory Context 
Cummins functions are defined relative to an explanation and we have just 
stressed how this allows us to determine the function of a type, and account for 
dysfunctions. We also mentioned the fact that Garson (2019) objects to this approach. 
He notes that both Craver (2001) and Hardcastle (2002) make statements along those 
lines (which define functions relative to explanatory interests), but he interprets those 
statements as saying that- "Simply put, dysfunction happens when a trait can’t do 
what we want." (Garson 2019, p. 1152) He goes on to explain that this makes no 
sense as functions cannot be reduced to preferences: "I’d prefer not to need sleep and 
water; I’d prefer if nobody had to go through the pain of childbirth or teething, either. 
But none of those things are dysfunctions. For that matter, I’d prefer if my hands were 
equipped with retractable adamantium claws. The fact that my hands can’t do what I 
want them to do doesn’t make them dysfunctional." (pp. 1152-3) 
To start, though, it is worth emphasizing that Cummins functions aren't 
defined by what we want a type to do, they are defined by what a scientific 
explanation says they do. If there was a scientific explanation that would explain how 
people exhibit a certain capacity 𝜓 by appealing to their hands' ability to produce 
adamantium claws, then relative to that explanation, the fact that Garson's hands 
cannot produce such claws would be a dysfunction, and that might explain why 
Garson cannot exhibit the capacity 𝜓. As stated in Godfrey-Smith's quote above- "The 
concept of malfunction is context-dependent on Cummins' view, just as the concept of 
function in general is." 
 And note that our appeal to scientific explanations also doesn't mean that 
scientists get to just decide the functions of components. Cummins's account of 
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functions gave clear conditions- the function of a type must be a capacity that at least 
some tokens of this type can exhibit, and it must be the case that this capacity enables 
an appropriate and adequate explanation of a capacity of the containing system. At the 
very least, these are strong restrictions on what can count as a function. It would be 
hard to claim that there actually is an "appropriate and adequate" explanation of some 
human capacity 𝜓, that appeals to the hands' ability to produce adamantium claws. 
And until such an explanation is provided, no one can state that it is the hands' 
function to produce such claws. For that matter, scientists don't decide that it is the 
function of the primary vestibular afferents to track head velocity. They show that the 
primary vestibular afferents are capable of tracking head velocity, and they show, 
through some explanation 𝐴, that this capacity of the vestibular afferents enables a 
capacity of the containing system. Only if this is achieved, and assuming that 𝐴 
appropriately and adequately accounts for the capacity of the containing system, will 
we state that it is the function of the primary vestibular afferents to track head 
velocity, relative to the explanation A. 
 Thus, Cummins functions do not allow for the type of rampant subjectivity 
Garson (2019) discusses. But they still are dependent on explanatory aims. A function 
is only defined relative to a given explanation, and I do think explanatory aims play a 
role in determining the relevant explanatory context. Neander (2017b, p. 1155) also 
states that: "There are explanatory aims when anyone tries to explain complex or, for 
that matter, simple capacities. And which causal contributions ought to be mentioned 
in a given explanatory context will depend on one’s aims. But, on Cummins’ account, 
if there are no relevant explanatory aims, then there are no functions. Explanatory 
aims are constitutive for Cummins functions." 
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 I am willing to accept this, and more importantly, accept what this entails for 
CFA. CFA will inherit Cummins functions dependence on explanatory context, and 
explanatory aims, and I would like to argue that there is nothing necessarily wrong 
with that. To start, though, let's try to better clarify the significance of the explanatory 
context for CFA. One way to do this is by briefly considering an altered variation of 
CFA, which takes the definition that was stated in 3.1, and attempts to rephrase it in a 
manner that does not appeal to a given explanation: 
The Altered Definition8 
Suppose that 𝑥 is an internal neural component of 𝑠, and that 𝑠 has some capacity to 
𝜓. Then, 
𝑥 is a neural representation of X, just in case: 
1. 𝑥 is capable of tracking X, and 
2. 𝑠's capacity to 𝜓 is partly due to the capacity of 𝑥 to track X. 
Instead of defining neural representations relative to a given neuroscientific 
explanation (as CFA does in 3.1), this altered definition defines neural representations 
relative to a given neuroscientific phenomenon (the capacity 𝜓 of the containing 
system). Does that mean that the explanatory context of CFA is actually unnecessary? 
I will offer two reasons to answer that question negatively, which correspond to two 
types of roles for the explanatory context. First, the explanatory context is necessary 
in order to single out the relevant phenomenon by which we define the representation. 
In fact, I would argue that the altered definition is itself implicitly committed to the 
explanatory context, since it only defines determinate representations relative to a 
 
8 I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this altered definition. 
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specific neuroscientific phenomenon 𝜓. Let us illustrate this point by considering a 
type of content determination problem. 
Consider a case where the same neural component 𝑥 can enable one cognitive 
capacity, 𝜓1, by tracking some property 𝑋1, and enable a different cognitive capacity, 
𝜓2, by tracking a different property 𝑋2.
9 What would the altered definition entail in 
this case? Initially, one might conclude that '𝑥 is a neural representation of both 𝑋1 
and 𝑋2'. But taking this route would leave us with an indeterminate notion of 
representation. Furthermore, to simply state that 𝑥 represents both 𝑋1 and 𝑋2 misses 
the fact that the altered definition does distinguish the two contents- they each serve 
different cognitive capacities. A more accurate conclusion would therefore seem to 
be: 'Relative to 𝜓1, 𝑥 is a neural representation of 𝑋1, and relative to 𝜓2, 𝑥 is a neural 
representation of 𝑋2.' But what does this statement actually mean? First of all, it 
 
9 The extent to which such cases actually occur is of course an empirical question, that 
is also dependent on the definition of tracking. But the possibility that the same neural 
component can carry different kinds of information to enable different cognitive 
capacities, certainly seems consistent with contemporary neuroscience. To give one 
type of example, we can consider Hubel and Wiesel's (1962, 1968) famous findings of 
orientation sensitive neurons in V1, which are commonly referenced in discussions of 
neural representations. It is actually widely accepted that the same neurons in V1 that 
enable orientation detection, also enable contrast discrimination, and are 
simultaneously sensitive to both orientation and contrast (e.g. Gawne 2000, Tolhurst et 
al. 1981, Reich et al. 2001). There is also recent evidence that color and orientation, 
which have traditionally been regarded as encoded by distinct neurons, are actually 
jointly coded in V1 (Garg et al. 2019). It thus seems that these V1 neurons, which are 
often referred to as representations of orientation, also track other visual properties 
which are relevant to different visual capacities. 
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means that the objective state of affairs in the world, in which 𝜓1 and 𝜓2 are on equal 
footing, does not in itself define 𝑥 as a determinate neural representation. Second, it 
means that if we focus specifically on 𝜓1 (or 𝜓2), then 𝑥 is a neural representation of 
𝑋1 (or 𝑋2). 
The objective state of affairs in the world does not single out one specific 
neuroscientific phenomenon to define the determinate content of 𝑥. And yet, person A 
could look at the objective state of affairs in the world and determine that 1. 𝑥 is 
capable of tracking 𝑋1, and 2. The cognitive capacity 𝜓1 is partly due to the capacity 
of 𝑥 to track 𝑋1. Thus, assuming the altered definition above, person A would 
correctly conclude that 𝑥 is a neural representation of 𝑋1. But in reaching this 
conclusion person A herself singled out the cognitive phenomenon 𝜓1 (as opposed to 
say 𝜓2), thus defining the neural representation relative to her own explanatory aims. 
This is the type of implicit commitment to explanatory context that is implied when a 
neural representation is defined relative to a given phenomenon. In other words, the 
neuroscientific phenomenon, while objectively real, isn't objectively given. Nothing 
objectively singles out this particular phenomenon from others, at least not to the 
extent that is necessary to define a determinate neural representation. Thus, when we 
define a neural representation relative to a specific phenomenon, we define it in a 
manner that is dependent on our explanatory aims. And whereas the altered definition 
introduces such explanatory dependence implicitly, CFA does so explicitly. 
Moving on, besides its role in singling out the relevant neuroscientific 
phenomenon, the explanatory context also plays a role in singling out the relevant 
tracking relation. This can be illustrated by posing a different content determination 
problem for the altered definition above. We can show that even after we fix the 
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relevant phenomenon 𝜓, the altered definition will likely be unable to define a 
determinate content. For example, consider the discussion in 3.2, where we appealed 
to CFA in order to define the primary vestibular afferents as representations of head 
velocity, relative to the explanation of VOR. Note that the altered definition can offer 
a similar conclusion. Condition 1 of the altered definition would demand that these 
neurons track head velocity, as we assumed they do in 3.2. And condition 2 would 
demand that this tracking relation enable the phenomenon of VOR. This was also 
illustrated in 3.2, thanks to Robinson's (1989) description of VOR mechanism. Hence, 
one could appeal to the altered definition to determine that, relative to the 
phenomenon of VOR, the primary vestibular afferents are representations of head 
velocity. But things get more complicated once we consider even a slightly more 
detailed description of the neural mechanism that underlies VOR. 
In 3.2, we identified the tracking capacity of the primary vestibular afferents 
by the fact that their discharge rate is correlated with head velocity. But this discharge 
rate is also correlated with many other causally relevant properties. For example, take 
a brief look at the causal mechanism within the semicircular canals. As the head 
rotates to one direction, the endolymph fluid within the semicircular canal lags behind 
(due to inertia) and thus flows in the opposite direction. This fluid pushes on the 
cupula, tilting it opposite the direction of head movement. As the cupula is deflected, 
the hair cells are bent and are consequently depolarized/hyperpolarized (depending on 
the direction of the cupula's deflection). The depolarization/hyperpolarization of hair 
cells leads to the excitation/inhibition of the primary vestibular afferents. 
Now, the fact that the discharge rate of the primary vestibular afferents 
correlates with head velocity is precisely due to the causal mechanism just described. 
But this means that the discharge rate of the vestibular afferents will also correlate 
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with the velocity of the endolymph fluid, with the state of the cupula, and with the 
depolarization of hair cells. And note that the causal relations between these 
properties and the primary vestibular afferents are all essential to the mechanism that 
enables VOR. So it seems one would be correct to claim that the phenomenon of 
VOR is partly due to the relation between the discharge rate of the primary vestibular 
afferents and the velocity of the endolymph fluid, for example. If we assume (like we 
did with regards to head velocity) that this is a tracking relation, we will thus find that 
both conditions of the altered definition hold. The primary vestibular afferents track 
the velocity of the endolymph fluid, and the phenomenon of VOR is partly due to this 
tracking relation. Hence, the altered definition will also define the primary vestibular 
afferents as representations of the velocity of the endolymph fluid, relative to the 
phenomenon of VOR. And we can reach similar conclusions with regards to the state 
of the cupula and the depolarization of hair cells. 
I suppose one might hold out hope that a proper definition of tracking could 
solve this type of content determination problem. But this seems highly unlikely. 
Teleosemantic theories of content have been attempting to deal with such problems 
for decades. And the consensus seems to be that tracking on its own is indeed 
indeterminate. Thus, teleosemantic theories appeal to function in an attempt to single 
out a specific tracking relation, and define a determinate representation. CFA does the 
same by appealing to Cummins functions. But that is not conveyed in the altered 
definition above. The altered definition only adds the condition that the tracking 
relation serve a more general neuroscientific capacity. And as illustrated in the VOR 
example, that condition is insufficient to define a determinate content. It cannot pick 
out one specific tracking relation that defines the representation. 
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CFA solves this problem by following Cummins (1975). Cummins didn't just 
define functions relative to a phenomenon, he defined them relative to an analysis of a 
phenomenon. Only then do we get a determinate function. (As quoted in 2.2: “To 
ascribe a function to something is to ascribe a capacity to it which is singled out by its 
role in an analysis of some capacity of a containing system.” (p. 765)) That is why we 
can state that, relative to the explanation of VOR, the function of the primary 
vestibular afferents is to track head velocity. And that is why, according to CFA, these 
neurons are representations of head velocity, and not of any other properties they 
might track. It is the explanation of VOR which singles out this particular capacity 
(tracking head velocity) as the relevant effect that these neurons contribute to the 
mechanism that enables VOR. 
We have thus clarified the significant role of the explanatory context for CFA. 
Safe to say, I think, that philosophers are traditionally averse to the possibility of 
explanations, and explanatory aims, having any role in defining representations. But I 
would like to claim that when it comes to CFA, such aversion is unjustified. To that 
end, let us try and ease a few possible worries. 
 
6. Defending the Appeal to Explanatory Context 
6.1. Compatibility with Neuroscientific Practice 
To start, the previous section raised the possibility that CFA will define the 
same neural component 𝑥 as being a representation of 𝑋1 in one context, and a 
representation of some different 𝑋2 in another context. Perhaps some would consider 
this a problem, or even claim it means CFA offers an indeterminate notion of 
representation. This latter claim is simply false, since CFA will only define 
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representations relative to a given explanatory context. Thus, the type of possibility 
we are discussing is not a case of an indeterminate representation. It is not a case 
where CFA defines a representation with two contents 𝑋1 and 𝑋2. Instead, this is a 
case where CFA defines the neural component 𝑥 as a determinate representation of 𝑋1 
in one context, while also defining the same neural component 𝑥 as a determinate 
representation of 𝑋2 in a different context. And I believe that this is precisely the type 
of outcome we should want. 
If CFA allows for a single neural component 𝑥 to be a representation of two 
different contents (in two different contexts), then that can only occur in the following 
scenario. First, there is a single neural component 𝑥 that has both the capacity to track 
𝑋1 and the capacity to track 𝑋2. Second, there are two neuroscientific explanations 𝐴1 
and 𝐴2, whereby 𝐴1 explains some brain capacity 𝜓1 by appealing to 𝑥's capacity to 
track 𝑋1, and 𝐴2 explains some brain capacity 𝜓2 by appealing to 𝑥's capacity to track 
𝑋2. Finally, we assume that both 𝐴1 and 𝐴2 appropriately and adequately account for 
the capacities 𝜓1 and 𝜓2, respectively. Only under these conditions would CFA 
define 𝑥 as having two different contents, relative to the different contexts. And again, 
I believe that under these conditions, we should want a theory that allows us to state 
that 𝑥 is a representation of 𝑋1 in one context, and a representation of 𝑋2 in the other. 
This is the simplest, most straightforward option. And it also seems consistent with 
contemporary neuroscience, where scientists often regard the same neural component 
as carrying different kinds of information, or "representing" different things.10  
 
10 This is mentioned in footnote 9, but there are many other types of examples (e.g. 
Desimone et al. 1985, Pinel et al. 2004, Haxby et al. 2001).  
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In general, any fear that the context sensitivity of CFA will allow us to define 
neural representations that are in some sense "unwanted", seems to be entirely 
unfounded. We have already stressed that CFA's dependence on explanatory context 
does not allow for some rampant subjectivity where scientists do as they please. If 
CFA defines 𝑥 as a neural representation of 𝑋, relative to some explanation 𝐴, that 
means that there is some successful (or "appropriate and adequate") neuroscientific 
explanation 𝐴 according to which some phenomenon is achieved, in part, because 𝑥 
has the capacity to track 𝑋. Why, then, would we not want to consider 𝑥 as a neural 
representation of 𝑋? Without assuming some alternative definition of neural 
representations, what reasoning could justify the claim that 'the fact that CFA 
identifies 𝑥 as a representation of 𝑋 is bad or counterintuitive'? It is normally 
precisely these cases – where a successful neuroscientific explanation appeals to an 
internal component that tracks some distal entity – which representationalists regard 
as evidence for the explanatory significance of representations. Thus, we should want 
a theory that defines this internal component as a representation, and that is what 
existing theories of content have always attempted to do. 
Still, some might insist that CFA's dependence on explanatory context will 
necessarily mean that it is incompatible with the actual neuroscientific practice. That 
is because defining representations relative to explanations means defining them in a 
manner that is at least partially subjective and non-naturalistic. Meanwhile, 
neuroscientists are generally in the business of describing real and objective 
phenomena, and studies such as (Bechtel 2016), and (Thomson and Piccinini 2018) 
have shown that this also applies to representations.11 Now, before I reply, it is worth 
 
11 I thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this point. 
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noting that others have drawn very different conclusions from investigations of 
neuroscientific explanations. Egan (2014), for example, concludes that content 
ascriptions must be pragmatic.12 But I will not be making such a claim here. Nor do I 
intend to prove here that CFA is the correct view of neural representations, which 
offers the best possible account for representations in neuroscience. As I mention at 
the conclusion of this paper, that still remains to be seen. But in order to establish 
CFA as a viable approach to neural representations, I do wish to show that CFA 
certainly can be consistent with the naturalistic, objective practices of neuroscientists. 
To that end, let us highlight some aspects of this view that are usually associated with 
"realistic" approaches to representations.13 
For starters, according to CFA, a tracking relation will only define a neural 
representation if it is essential to a neuroscientific explanation. Hence, neural 
representations are essential components of neuroscientific explanations. That is, 
CFA is not a deflationary view of representations. Additionally, I would also claim 
that CFA is consistent with vehicle realism. Shea (2018, p.15) states: "I will reserve 
the term ‘realism’ for accounts that are committed to there being real vehicles of 
content: individuable physical particulars that bear contents and whose causal 
interactions explain behaviour." CFA, I would argue, is consistent with this demand. 
The primary vestibular afferents, for example, are individuable physical particulars 
that bear contents and whose causal interactions explain behavior, hence real vehicles 
of content. Now, it is possible some would want to insist that "vehicle realism" should 
 
12 See also Egan's reply to (Bechtel 2016) in (Egan 2020). 
13 In doing so we also differentiate CFA from Egan's pragmatism, and some other 




also imply that the vehicle has its contents intrinsically. I think that would be a 
mistake. But frankly, whether you want to call it "vehicle realism" or not, the 
important point is that CFA regards real individuable physical particulars as carriers 
of content. 
And it's more than that. In defining a representation, CFA also demands that 
this real physical particular "track" some property X (its content). While we have not 
committed to any definition of "tracking", CFA is certainly consistent with the (very 
likely) possibility that this is an objective relation in the world. In that case, neural 
representations, according to CFA, are dependent on scientists finding an objective 
"tracking" relation between a real physical particular and some property X. 
Furthermore, according to CFA, this tracking relation will only define a 
representation if it plays an essential role in enabling a more complex phenomenon. 
And it is again highly likely that scientists show this by pointing at an objectively real 
causal structure, such as the physical mechanism that enables VOR. All in all, we find 
that CFA is consistent with the possibility that neural representations are real physical 
particulars that exhibit an objective "tracking" relation, within an objectively real 
causal structure. All of which, of course, must be discovered empirically by 
neuroscientists. 
Still, as discussed in section 5, CFA also maintains the necessity of the 
explanatory context in picking out these specific (objective) phenomena. But I do 
hope that the discussion above helps clarify why this type of explanatory dependence 
does not necessarily clash with the objective practices of neuroscientists. Again, we 
will still need to check and see which available theory best conforms to the scientific 
practice. But it would be a mistake to dismiss CFA just because we have stated that it 
is dependent on explanatory context. I think there is reason to believe that CFA can 
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capture the notion of representation that is relevant to neuroscience, and we have seen 
some evidence for the advantages of this context-dependent view. But we have yet to 
touch upon the fact that CFA violates the naturalistic constraint. 
 
6.2. Against the Naturalistic Constraint 
The naturalistic constraint is the demand that a theory of content be specifiable 
in non-semantic, non-intentional terms. Thus, CFA violates the naturalistic constraint 
by defining representations relative to a given explanation and with respect to 
scientists' explanatory aims. And since the project of accounting for neural 
representations is often considered synonymous with the project of finding a 
naturalistic theory of content, the possibility of violating the naturalistic constraint 
might seem atrocious to some. Obviously, I disagree. 
Ultimately, the basic reasoning behind the naturalistic constraint is that if we 
are to have a theory that explains content, then it can't itself be dependent on content 
(or semantics, or intentionality). But importantly, CFA makes no claims towards 
explaining content in any general sense. It only aims to account for the notion of 
representation we find in current neuroscientific practice. And I suppose that in this 
regard CFA may have strayed from the norm. Traditionally, theories of content have 
been considered in significantly different contexts. Through theories such as the 
Representational Theory of Mind (RTM), or the Representational Theory of 
Intentionality, philosophers of mind have attempted to account for the nature of 
thought and mental intentionality by positing the existence of internal mental 
representations. And if mental representations are used to explain intentionality, then 
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intentionality can't be used to explain mental representations. Thus, theories of 
content for such mental representations must be naturalistic. 
Even theories of content which are specifically aimed at accounting only for 
subpersonal/nonconceptual/nonconscious representations (Shea 2018, Neander 
2017a), are still normally regarded as ultimately serving some grander naturalization 
project in the philosophy of mind. As Shea puts it: 
"My overall philosophical strategy, then, is to start with the subpersonal and 
work upwards. […] If we are puzzled about how there could be space in the 
natural world for intentionality at all, then seeing how it arises in a range of 
cases in cognitive science will be a major step towards resolving the puzzle. 
Furthermore, seeing how representational content arises and earns its 
explanatory keep in these cases should prove a useful staging post on the way to 
tackling the more complex cases. So, an account of subpersonal representational 
content is part of a broader strategy for tackling the problem of intentionality." 
(Shea 2018, pp. 27-28) 
Neander (2017a) offers the same strategy. Her theory accounts solely for 
subpersonal nonconceptual representations, but she also makes it abundantly clear 
that her ultimate goal is to account for mental intentionality in general.14 Neander 
 
14 Neander's (2017a) is titled "A Mark of the Mental", and she immediately clarifies the 
book "aims to persuade readers that – while the theory it offers is limited in scope – it 
makes genuine progress toward a naturalistic account of mental representation." (p. 1) 
She also states that, if her theory is correct, then "what is left is the ramping-up 
problem, which is the problem of understanding how to get from a theory of content 
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even states that it this ultimate goal- accounting for mental intentionality, that should 
lead us to exclude Cummins functions from theories of content: "It won’t do, for 
example, to claim that the relevant functions are ontologically grounded in the 
explanatory aims of researchers (as Cummins does) and then explain intentional 
mental phenomena, such as the explanatory aims of researchers, as grounded in such 
functions. That would be circular."  (Neander 2017a, p.86) 
But unlike Neander (2017a) and Shea (2018), CFA is truly not concerned, 
either directly or indirectly, with the attempts to "explain intentional mental 
phenomena, such as the explanatory aims of researchers". CFA is not in any way 
intended to serve the naturalization project of thought, intentionality, or content. Not 
that I oppose such projects, but that's simply not the goal of CFA. CFA is offered with 
the sole aim of accounting for neural representations, which we defined in section 1 
as the representations that are posited in contemporary neuroscience. We only care 
about successfully characterizing the notion of representation that is relevant to 
current neuroscientific practice. Why, then, must our theory of content adhere to the 
naturalistic constraint?  
 There is a common assumption that an account of neural representations has to 
also (somehow) serve a more general account of intentionality. As Sprevak states: "it 
is widely assumed that neural representations are more fundamental than, and ground, 
other representations. Neural representations ground, and are somehow responsible 
for, personal-level thoughts such as beliefs, desires, and intentions. Personal-level 
representations in turn ground conventional representations such as signs, maps, and 
 
for nonconceptual representations to a theory of the referential power of sophisticated 
human thought." (p. 26) 
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public language." (Sprevak 2013, p. 552) And this type of assumption can justify the 
naturalistic constraint. We cannot appeal to neural representations to ground personal 
level intentions if we appeal to the intentions of scientists to ground neural 
representations. 
 But I reject this line of thought. To be precise, I reject the assumption that 
neural representations must be able to play this type of 'grounding' role. Again, we 
identified neural representations as the representations that are posited in 
contemporary neuroscience. Now, I have no intention of opposing RTM, or the idea 
that subpersonal representations can somehow ground personal level thoughts. But to 
assume that the representations that are posited in contemporary neuroscience are 
these subpersonal representations that will ultimately serve a naturalistic account of 
intentionality, is a hopeful hypothesis at best. And a hopeful hypothesis cannot define 
a necessary constraint. 
There might be good reasons for wanting neural representations to enable a 
naturalistic account of intentionality, but that doesn't mean there are good reasons to 
assume that has to be the case. We cannot preemptively constrain a theory of neural 
representations to be naturalistic, just because we want it to be the case that the same 
representations that neuroscientists appeal to, will also somehow ground the 
intentionality of thought. If we are looking for an account of neural representations, 
then that means we must look for the theory that best accounts for the notion of 
representation that is relevant to neuroscience. And whether or not a theory 
successfully accounts for representations in neuroscience, is not dependent on 
whether or not this theory can also help us account for the intentionality of thought. 
Once the task of accounting for neural representations is adequately detached from 
"the problem of intentionality", the naturalistic constraint loses its justification. 
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To be clear, it's only the constraint that loses its justification. It's only the 
claim that a theory of content for neural representations must necessarily be 
naturalistic that I reject here. I am not arguing against naturalistic theories of content. 
I am just saying that, when it comes to theories of neural representations, being 
naturalistic is not a necessary constraint. It could still be viewed as an advantage. I 
certainly agree, for that matter, that it would be nice to have a theory of neural 
representations that can also ground mental intentionality and content in general. And 
obviously CFA, at least as it is described in this paper, does not seem to achieve that. 
It is worth noting, though, that neither does any other existing account. No one has 
been able to actually make good on this promise to explain mental intentionality by 
grounding it in a naturalistic theory of content. As Sprevak notes: "Unfortunately, and 
despite a large investment of effort, an adequate theory of natural representation has 
not been forthcoming. Many contemporary philosophers suspect that representation 
simply cannot be naturalized." (Sprevak 2013, p. 547). So perhaps trying a different 
approach is not such a bad idea. Sprevak (2013) and Egan (2012, 2014), for example, 
have also offered alternative theories of content for neural representations that do not 
accept the naturalistic constraint as defined above.15 
Much more importantly though, and the point I have been trying to make 
throughout this section, is that it is wrong to let external considerations restrict our 
account of neural representations. The only question we should care about is whether 
or not CFA best accounts for the notion of representation that is relevant to 
 
15 Though we should note that Egan does consider her theory as advancing the program 
of naturalizing intentionality (see Egan 2014, pp. 130-131, or Egan 2018, p. 256). 
Nevertheless, it is clear that Egan's theory of content does not abide by the naturalistic 
constraint as defined above. 
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contemporary neuroscientific explanations. And if it turns out that it does, we must 
conclude that neural representations really are what CFA says they are. The 
implications CFA might somehow carry for the naturalization program in the 
philosophy of mind, whether we like them or not, change nothing about that. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 I believe that Cummins's notion of function holds the key to understanding 
neural representations, and that this has been wrongly overlooked in the 
philosophical debate thus far. This paper proposes the Cummins Functions Approach 
(CFA) to neural representations. On CFA, neural representations are defined by a 
function of tracking, and the notion of function is understood by Cummins's (1975) 
account. I illustrated how CFA can account for the notion of representation that is 
relevant to neuroscientific explanations, and defended it from a number of possible 
challenges. We saw how this approach can account for the normativity of 
representations, and discussed its appeal to explanatory context. While philosophers 
tend to oppose theories of content that appeal to explanations, I attempted to show 
why, as it relates to CFA, we should be willing (and perhaps happy) to accept its 
dependence on explanatory context. 
 Of course, this is only the beginning. The obvious next step is to commit to a 
specific theory of content. CFA generalizes over different possible definitions of 
tracking, and an actual theory of content for neural representations must commit to 
one such definition. Once we have a theory of content, along the lines of CFA, we can 
compare it to other accounts with the aim of proving that it truly captures what neural 
representations are. But while that still remains to be settled, I do hope this paper 
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successfully illustrates the promise of taking the Cummins Functions Approach 
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